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CURTAILING THE
ARBITRATOR'S POWER:VALID
WITHHOLDING OF
JURISDICTIONOR JUDICIAL
FLAW?
Cobler v. Stanley, Barber,Southard, Brown & Associates

1

I. INTRODUCTION
With the movement toward alternative dispute resolution comes the issue of
how much freedom arbitrators will be given before the courts will find the
arbitrator's rulings to be beyond their jurisdiction. This Note will provide an
understanding of the decision in Cobler v. Stanley, Barber, Southard, Brown &
Associates,where the court limited the power of the arbitrator. 2 Further, this Note
will explain how Cobler is inconsistent with California case law which suggests
that great deference shall be given to the power of arbitrators.

II. THE CASE
Ed Cobler, desiring to live in San Diego, California, flew to San Diego in
April 1987 and met with a representative from Stanley, Barber, Southard, Brown
& Associates (hereinafter Stanley Barber), a professional career consulting agency,
for the purpose of finding employment. 3 Cobler was told that Stanley Barber4
would secure job interviews for Cobler and three job offers within ninety days.
Cobler and Stanley Barber entered into a contract which contained an arbitration
clause and provided for $1,400 in fees.5 Cobler returned to San Diego from
Colorado three times to meet with Stanley Barber representatives during his job
hunt. 6 Cobler's third visit resulted in a meeting with a representative who spent
three hours with Cobler before handing him a telephone book and telling him to
set up his own interviews. 7 Cobler found this method futile and returned to the

1.
2.
3.
4.

217 Cal. App. 3d 518, 265 Cal. Rptr. 868 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
Id.
217 Cal. App. 3d at 523, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 869-70.
Id. at 523, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 870.

5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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Stanley Barber office only to find his representative leaving town. 8 After another9
unsuccessful meeting with another representative, Cobler returned to Colorado.
Stanley Barber solicited Cobler to pay the $1,450 contract price.1 ° After
those requests proved futile, Stanley Barber petitioned the American Arbitration
Association (hereinafter AAA) for arbitration, giving as its complaint the
nonpayment of the
contract price." In addition, Stanley Barber also sought
12
arbitration costs.

Stanley Barber amended its petition a month later to include a claim that
13
Cobler continued to make verbal and written allegations and threats against it.
Cobler then filed a counterdemand for arbitration claiming breach of contract and
seeking $2,496.13 plus $300 arbitration fees. 14 Through his attorney, Cobler
amended his counterdemand, adding a $75,000 claim for punitive damages on
"unspecified grounds."'15 With both parties' consent an arbitrator was appointed.' 6 Three arbitration sessions were held, in addition to
a supplemental briefing
17
by each of the parties, at the request of the arbitrator.
The arbitrator awarded Cobler $9,852.86, $7,500 of which was for emotional
damages.' 8 The arbitrator found that Stanley Barber was negligent and had
breached its contract with Cobler. 19 In addition, the award ordered Stanley
Barber to give Cobler $332.92 as
fees paid to AAA by Cobler and to pay AAA
20
$750 for the arbitrator's salary.
Subsequently, Cobler filed a petition in the superior court to confirm the
arbitration award.2 1 In return, Stanley Barber filed a petition to overturn the
award on the statutory grounds of corruptness of the arbitrator, 22 error of law on
the face of the decision, 23 and "excess of jurisdiction of the issues resolved and
the amount awarded." 24 The trial court upheld the award and held that there was

8. ld.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. ld. at 524, 265 Cal, Rptr. at 870-71.

18. Id. at 524, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 871 n.1. The award of $9,852.86 to Cobler was broken down
as follows: refund of all monies paid under contract, $1,400; mileage, $636; lodging, $216.86;
compensation for five missed days of work, $500; emotional distress resulting from conduct of
Stanley Barber, $7,500; offset for value received, $400. Id.
19. ld. at 524, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 870.
20. Id.

21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 524, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 871.
Id. The trial court held that there was no corruption on the part of the arbitrator. Id.

Id. The trial court held there was no error of law on the face of the decision. Id.
Id. The statutory claims are supported by CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 1285, 1286.2(a), (d),

(e) (West 1982).
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no excess of jurisdiction since the parties agreed to widen the issues in the
pleadings to include infliction of emotional distress. 25 The superior court
confirmed the $9,852.86 award for Cobler and demanded that Stanley Barber pay
26
$750 additional costs to the AAA.
Stanley Barber appealed to the California Court of Appeals, Fourth
District. 27 The court of appeals addressed the issues of the arbitrator's
impartiality, 28 the award of costs to the AAA, 29 and the alleged excess of
jurisdiction by the arbitrator. 30 Stanley Barber claimed that the arbitrator did not
have jurisdiction to award tort damages for emotional distress or any other
damages over the contract damages pled in the demands for arbitration.3 1 The
court first looked to the arbitration clause in the contract to determine whether the
arbitrator exceeded his jurisdiction. 32 The arbitration clause read: "should there
be a dispute arising from this Agreement, it is mutually agreed that it shall be
promptly settled through binding arbitration in accordance with the rules of the
[AAA]." 33 The court ruled that the arbitration clause was limited in scope and
34
did not provide for the arbitrator to rule on the claim of emotional damages.
Therefore, the court struck down the part of the arbitration award that provided
damages for emotional distress.35 The court of appeals held that when an
arbitration agreement limits the scope of an arbitrator's authority, the arbitrator has
the duty to confine the arbitration ruling to the issues pled by the parties;
therefore, informal amendments to the pleading will not increase the arbitrator's
36
jurisdiction.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Cobler court struck down the arbitrator's grant of emotional damages by
finding that the arbitrator exceeded the limits of the arbitration agreement. 37 In
finding that the arbitrator exceeded his jurisdiction, the court placed strong

25. Cobler, 217 Cal. App. 3d at 525, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 526, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
28. Id. at 526, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 873. The court held that the trial court did not error in
finding no bias existed on the part of the arbitrator. Id.
29. Id. at 533, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 877. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in ordering the $750 to be paid directly to the AAA. Id.
30. Id. at 530, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 875-77.
31. d. at 530, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 531, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 876.
35. Id. at 532, 265 Cal Rptr. at 877.
36. Id. The Court of Appeals also held that there was no actual bias on the part of the
arbitrator. Stanley Barber asserted that the arbitrator was biased, because he was a law partner in
the law firm that represented one of Stanley Barber's major competitors. No abuse of discretion
was found on the part of the trial court in ordering the $750 to be paid directly to the AAA. Id.
37. Id.
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to be a narrower arbitration clause than usually
importance on what it perceived
38
found in other contracts.
California has long held that an arbitrator derives his power from the
arbitration agreement and is prohibited from exceeding this power. 39 The policy
behind this rule is to give effect to the contractual obligations and rights between
those parties entering into the arbitration agreement. 40 However, no policy exists
in compelling persons to accept arbitration of issues which41they have not agreed
to arbitrate and which are not made arbitrable by statute.
A California court of appeals in Mansdorf v. CaliforniaPhysicians' Service
Inc.4 2 held that arbitrators are bound by the arbitration agreement because
arbitration is a matter of contract. 43 Since the arbitrator is confined to deciding
disputes within the arbitration agreements, California courts interpret arbitration
44
The
agreements differently depending upon a slight change in wording.
Mansdorfcourt interpreted an arbitration agreement which required "arbitration of
disputes with respect to any of the terms, conditions or benefits of this agreement"
in a narrow fashion. It held that a subscriber's claim of bad faith on the part of
the operator of a health benefit plan is outside of the scope of the arbitration
agreement. 45 However, the district court of appeals in Crofoot v. Blair Holding
Corporation46 gave broader meaning to an arbitration agreement which stated
that the parties agreed to arbitrate "all issues existing between them and raised by
any pleadings served by any of them in any of the said actions ...... ,47

The

arbitration agreement further provided that "[t]he arbitrator shall be given such
powers as are provided for by law." 48 The Crofoot court held that this agreement includes liabilities in tort as well as liabilities in contract. 49 In Berman v.
Dean Witter & Co., Inc.,50 the court of appeals held that the arbitration agreement which read "any controversy ... arising out of or relating to this contract
51
." included both contract and tort claims.

38. Id. at 530, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
39. See generally William B. Logan & Assocs. v. Monogram Precision Indus. Inc., 184 Cal.
App. 2d 12, 7 Cal. Rptr. 212 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1960); Delta Lines, Inc. v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters, 66 Cal. App. 3d 960, 136 Cal. Rptr. 345 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977); Mansdorf v. California
Physicians' Serv., Inc., 87 Cal. App. 3d 412, 151 Cal. Rpir. 388 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
40. Delta Lines, 66 Cal. App. 3d at 960, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 345.
41. id.
42. 87 Cal. App. 3d 412, 151 Cal. Rptr. 388 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
43. Id. at 417, 151 Cal. Rplr. at 391.
44. Cobler, 217 Cal. App. 3d at 518, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 868.
45. Mansdorf, 87 Cal. App. 3d at 417, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
46. 119 Cal. App. 2d 156, 260 P.2d 156 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1953).
47. Id. at 164, 260 P.2d at 159.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. 44 Cal. App. 3d 999, 119 Cal. Rptr. 130 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975).
51. id. at 1003, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
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Because arbitration is favored as a means of settlin disputes, California
courts have given the utmost effect to such proceedings.5 Another reason for
giving great weight to arbitration proceedings is that each of the parties agreed to
be bound by any award pursuant to the provisions of their contract.53 Not only
the arbitration proceedings, but also the decisions of the arbitrators themselves are
given a significant amount of deference; so as a general rule, arbitrators do not
have to give reasons and findings of facts for their awards.5 4 As a further
indicator of favoring arbitration, California courts have held that arbitrators, unless
specifically required to act in conformity with 55
rules of law, may base their award
upon "broad principles of justice and equity."
The grounds for vacating an arbitration award in California are controlled by
statute.56 In particular, an arbitration award will be set aside if the court
determines that: (1) the award was obtained through any undue means; 57 (2)
there was corruption on the part of the arbitrator;5 8 (3) the rights of a party were
substantially prejudiced by misconduct of the arbitrator; 59 (4) the arbitrator went
beyond his or her power and therefore the award cannot be remedied without
affecting the merits of the decision; 6° or (5) the arbitrator refused to postpone
the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown, resulting in substantial prejudice
to a party; or the arbitrator refused to hear evidence material to the dispute; or the
arbitrator displayed general misconduct. 61 This statute provides the only grounds
62
for setting aside an arbitration award in California.
In general, an error of law committed by the arbitrator, regardless of how
severe, is not a ground for vacating an arbitration award.63 At least one court
has held that an award may be set aside as being in excess of the arbitrator's
powers if it is in violation of California civil procedure. 64 However, even if the
award conflicts with substantive law, the arbitrator may make a binding award
which a court is required to enforce. 65 Unsound reasoning on the part of an

52. Atlas Floor Covering v. Crescent House & Garden, Inc., 166 Cal. App. 2d 211, 333 P.2d
194, (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959). This court held that every intendment of validity must be given to
an arbitration award and the arbitration proceeding may be based on broad principles of equity. Id.
at 215, 333 P.2d at 197.
53. Mansdorf, 87 Cal. App. 3d at 412, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
54. Sapp v. Barenfeld, 34 Cal. 2d 515, 212 P.2d 233 (Cal. 1949).
55. See generally Lewsadder v. Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc., 36 Cal. App. 3d 255, 100
Cal. Rptr. 405 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973); Delta Lines, 66 Cal. App. 3d 960, 136 Cal. Rptr. 345.
56. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1286.2 (West 1982).
57. Id. § 1286.2(a).
58. Id. § 1286.2(b).
59. Id. § 1286.2(c).
60. Id. § 1286.2(d).
61. Id. § 1286.2(e).
62. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Galeserian, 28 Cal. App. 3d 397, 403, 104 Cal. Rptr.
683, 687 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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arbitrator in reachin E a conclusion within the scope of arbitration will not
invalidate the award.
Even an erroneous conclusion based on an error in law
which does not appear from the record will not render the award invalid. 67
However, where the error appears on the face of the record and causes substantial
injustice, the award may be vacatedft 8
California courts have also held that neither the merits of the controversy nor the
69
sufficiency of the evidence to support the arbitrator's award are reviewable.
Decisions such as Johnston v. Security Insurance Co. of Hartford7° suggest that
a court will give great weight to an arbitrator's award. Only when courts exceed
the parameters
of the arbitration clause will the arbitration award be struck
71
down.
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
The Cobler court curtailed the movement in California toward giving great
weight to an arbitrator's findings. After examining each of the possible grounds
the arbitrator may have relied on in awarding emotional damages, the court72struck
down each one and concluded that the arbitrator exceeded his authority.
First, the Cobler court determined that the issues presented to the arbitrator
were contract claims (raised by both parties); Stanley Barber's claim that Cobler
had made allegations and threats; Cobler's $75,000 claim for punitive damages
based on his contract claim; and Cobler's theories of fraud and emotional
distress. 73 The court further observed that the arbitrator did not rule on the fraud
issue. 74 The issue before the court, then, was whether the $7,500 for emotional
distress was within the scope of the matters submitted.75
The court observed that the arbitrator determined that Stanley Barber had
breached an unspecified duty of care to Cobler and had also breached its
contract. 76 The court then stated that apparently the arbitrator treated the matter
as a professional negligence or malpractice matter.77 However, the court
determined that the award of damages for emotional distress could not have been

66. Durand v. Wilshire Ins. Co., 270 Cal. App. 2d 58, 75 Cal. Rptr. 115 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969).
67. See Ray Wilson Co. v. Anaheim Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 166 Cal. App. 3d 1081, 213 Cal.
Rptr. 62 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); Abbott v. California State Auto Ass'n, 68 Cal. App. 3d 763, 137 Cal.
Rptr. 580 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977).

68. Id.
69. See Johnston v. Security Ins. Co. of Hartford, 6 Cal. App. 3d 839, 86 Cal. Rptr. 133 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1970); Delta Lines, 66 Cal. App. 3d 960, 136 Cal. Rptr. 345.
70. 6 Cal. App. 3d 839, 86 Cal Rptr. 133 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970).

71. Id
72. Cobler, 217 Cal. App. 3d at 518, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 876.
73. Id. at 523, 265 Cal.Rptr. at 875.

74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1991/iss1/14
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based on the contract issues, since this type of damages is rarely awarded in
breach of contract claims. 78 According to the Cobler court, then, the only basis
for emotional distress79damages must have been based on any tort issue properly
before the arbitrator.
The court next stated that Stanley Barber's claim that Cobler threatened
Stanley Barber did not support an award of emotional distress damages against
Stanley Barber. 80 The court then assumed that the punitive damages claim was
based on fraud; yet, since the arbitrator held he was not ruling on fraud, there was
no basis for punitive damages for emotional distress. 81 It further stated that the
scope of the submissions did not include negligence findings.82 Finally, the
court held that emotional damages could not have been based on professional
malpractice because there is no authority for extending malpractice doctrines to a
professional career consulting agency.8 3 Nor was this a proper claim for
84
negligent infliction of emotional distress.
The court addressed Stanley Barber's claim that the arbitrator decided issues
and awarded damages beyond the scope of the submissions to the arbitrator. It
drew a distinction between the arbitration clause in the instant decision and an
arbitration clause which allows arbitration of "any controversy ... arising out of
or relating to this agreement", holding that the latter is broader in scope. 85 The
court therefore agreed with Stanley Barber that the arbitrator had exceeded his
scope of powers. To support its contention, the court cited Mansdorfv. California
Physicians' Service Inc.,86 in which the California Court of Appeals drew a like
87
distinction between two types of arbitration clauses.
The Cobler court also relied on Delta Lines Inc. v. InternationalBrotherhood
of Teamsters88 for the proposition that the powers of an arbitrator are confined
by the arbitration clause or submitted issues.89 The court also cited Atlas Floor
Covering v. Crescent House & Gardens9° for the proposition that an arbitrator

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 526, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 876.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

84. Id.

85.
86.
87.
required

Id.
87 Cal. App. 3d 412, 151 Cal. Rptr. 388 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
Id. at 414, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 388. Mansdorfinterpretedan arbitration clause which
arbitration "of disputes with respect to any of the terms, conditions or benefits of this

agreement." Id. at 417, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 391. The Mansdorf court found this clause to be much
more limiting than the arbitration agreement found in Crofoot which required arbitration of "all
issues existing between them and raised by any pleadings ..... Crofoot, 119 Cal. App. 2d at 159,

260 P.2d at 159.
88. 66 Cal. App. 3d 960, 136 Cal. Rptr. 345.
89. Id. at 964, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 349.
90. 166 Cal. App. 2d 211, 333 P.2d 194.
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91
may not create a new cause of action which gives rise to new damages.
Additionally, the court relied upon the California Code of Civil Procedure92 to.
invalidate the award based on its finding that the arbitrator exceeded his powers.
In particular, section 1286.2(d) states that an arbitration award which purports to
decide unsubmitted issues is to be vacated.93 Finally, the court looked to Ray
Wilson Co., v. Anaheim Memorial HospitalAssociation,9 4 which held that the
courts will not intervene when the arbitrator has made an error of law, unless the
error results from an irrational construction of the disputed contractual provisions.95 The Ray Wilson court gave special consideration to whether the
arbitrator ignored the contractual provisions or misinterpreted the provisions in the
contract for arbitration.96 The Cobler court concluded that this was a case
in
97
which the arbitrator irrationally construed the disputed contract provisions.

V.

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

A cursory reading of Coblerwould lead one to believe that the court simply
curtailed the powers of an arbitrator based upon supportive case law and statutory
authority. However, a closer reading reveals that while the court achieved its goal
of striking down the award for emotional distress, it did so by a suspicious reading
of California case law and statutes. In particular, the court's analysis of
Mansdorf,98 Ray Wilson,9 and section 1286.2 of the California Code of Civil
Procedure' ° ° is misguided in its application to the instant case.
A major part of the court's holding is based upon the arbitration agreement
being limited in scope.101 For support of this finding Cobler relied principally
on Mansdorf.10 2 The Mansdorfcourt was faced with an arbitration agreement
which required arbitration of "disputes with respect to any of the terms, conditions
or benefits of this agreement." 1° 3 The Cobler court compared the arbitration
clause in the contract between Cobler and Stanley Barber to the clause discussed
in the Mansdorf holding and found that the arbitration clauses in both cases were

91. Id.
92. CAL CIV. PROC. Code § 1286.2(d) (West 1982).
93. Cobler, 217 Cal. App. 3d at 518, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 868.
94. Ray Wilson, 166 Cal. App. 3d at 1081, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 62.
95. Cobler, 217 Cal. App. 3d at 532, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 876.
96. Ray Wilson, 166 Cal. App. 3d at 1081, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 62.
97. See Cobler, 217 Cal. App. 3d at 532, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 876.
98. Mansdorf,87 Ca]. App. 3d at 412, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
99. Ray Wilson, 166 Cal. App. 3d at 1081, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 62.
100. CAL CIV. PROC. Code § 1286.2(d) (West 1982).
101. Cobler, 217 Cal. App. 3d at 518, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 868.
102. Id. at 530, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 875, citing Mansdorf,87 Cal. App. 3d 412, 151 Cal. Rptr.
388.
103. Mansdorf, 87 Cal. App. 3d at 412, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
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of "any controversy
more limited in scope than a clause providing for 10arbitration
4
...arising out of or relating to this agreement."
However, the arbitration clause in Mansdorf is strikingly different than the
clause discussed in Cobler. The arbitration clause in Mansdorf was limited to
disputes of the terms, conditions or benefits of the agreement.1'5 The arbitration agreement in Cobler did not include language limiting the jurisdiction of the
arbitrator to the terms of the agreement. °6 Instead, the arbitration agreement
in Cobler bestowed upon the arbitrator the power to hear disputes "arising from
this Agreement." 10 7 A stronger argument could be made for the limited holding
in Coblerif the arbitration clause could truly be read as being similar to the clause
in Mansdorf. The Cobler court did not state why the arbitration clause before it
was closer in meaning to the clause found in Mansdorf, than a clause which
requires arbitration of "any disputes arising out of or relating to this agreement."

10 8

Coblercites Ray Wilson for the proposition that where an arbitrator has made
an error of law, the courts will intervene only when the error is based on a
"completely irrational construction to the provision in dispute."' ° 9 Ray Wilson
stands for the proposition that the merits of the controversy are for the arbitrator,
not the courts. 110 Further, Ray Wilson stands for the rule of law that it is not
the place of the court to review the sufficiency of the evidence before the
arbitrator or to question the soundness of the arbitrator's reasoning. 1 1 Ironically, the Cobler court cites Ray Wilson for these propositions, 11 2 yet fails to
explain how Ray Wilson is applicable to the facts found in Cobler.
Another justification the Cobler court gave for striking down the award for
emotional distress damages was its reliance on California Code of Civil Procedure
section 1286.2.113 This provision states that a court shall vacate an award if the
court determines that "[t]he arbitrators exceeded their powers and the award cannot
be corrected without affecting the merits of the decision upon the controversy
d 4 However, a majority of Cobler's reasoning is spent
submitted . .
dissecting the arbitrator's findings and stating its belief that the facts taken
together do not support a finding of damages for emotional distress.1 15 By
doing so, the court comes dangerously close to implying that if the arbitrator

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
417, 151
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Cobler, 217 Cal. App. 3d at 394, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
Mansdorf, 87 Cal. App. 3d at 412, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
Cobler, 217 Cal. App. 3d at 518, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 868.
d.
Cobler, 217 Cal. App. 3d at 530, Cal. Rptr. at 875, quoting Mansdorf,87 Cal. App. 3d at
Cal. Rptr at 391.
Ray Wilson, 166 Cal. App. 3d at 1091, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 68.
Id. at 1092, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 69.
Id.
Cobler, 217 Cal. App. 3d at 530, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 876.
Id. at 530, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1286.2 (West 1982).
Cobler, 217 Cal. App. 3d at 518, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 868.
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makes an incorrect finding then the arbitrator has necessarily exceeded his
powers. 116 But the California Code of Civil Procedure does not provide that
incorrect findings on the part of an arbitrator justify the setting aside of an
arbitration award.
In Cobler v. Stanley, Barber, Southard, Brown & Associates, the court
implies that the arbitrator made a mistake as to law; yet the court vacated the
award by characterizing the arbitrator's actions as being in excess of his
powers. 11 7 While no case law has emerged supporting or overturning Cobler,
it appears that Cobler has created another ground, not recognized by California
statute, which will justify setting aside an arbitrator's award.
KEVIN L. WIBBENMEYER

116. Id.
117. Id. at 533, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 877.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1991/iss1/14

10

